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INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
 
This article focuses on the factors in-
hibiting a productive rethinking of the past 
in contemporary Lithuanian-Russian rela-
tions. The rethinking of the past is under-
stood as a process facilitating the reconsid-
eration of historical meanings through ad-
justing them to the expectations and values 
of the contemporary society. The author ar-
gues that in this process historical re-
search — as an important tool for encour-
aging the co-existence of communities — 
should fulfil certain social functions. Hav-
ing chosen the Lithuanian-Russian commu-
nication space as a case, the author empha-
sises the need to develop an interest in mu-
tual knowledge of cultures of remembrance 
in this space. Outlining the strategies spe-
cific to the prevailing cultures of remem-
brance in contemporary Russia and Lithua-
nia, the author addresses the issue of their 
proper relationship, as well as that of the 
appropriateness of historical policy. The 
criminalisation of certain evaluations of the 
past and the academic dialogue between 
historians are regarded as two opposite ex-
tremes of historical policy actually existing 
in the Lithuanian-Russian communication 
space. The author stresses that research 
into the values and interpretations of the 
past peculiar to certain social groups in 
both Lithuania and Russia may be consid-
ered as a basis for further development of 
the historical dialogue. It is assumed that 
such research may contribute to the im-
provement in the field of politics of history. 
 
Key words: culture of remembrance, 
politics of history, rethinking of the past, 
Lithuanian-Russian relations 
 
The growing distance between the 
academic historical research and the 
simplified images of the past nurtured 
AN ESCAPE  
FROM THE EMBRACE  
OF POLITICS. A STUDY  
INTO THE CULTURES  
OF REMEMBRANCE  
AS A MEANS  
TO ENCOURAGE  
A HISTORICAL DIALOGUE  
IN LITHUANIAN-RUSSIAN  
RELATIONS 
 
V. Safronovas* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Klaipėda University  
84, Herkaus Manto, Klaipeda,  
LT-92294, Lithuania 
 
Received on January 5, 2012. 
 
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2012-2-1 
V. Safronovas 
5 
within the social discourse became a general trend of the contemporary 
knowledge space. Therefore, one can assume that one of the goals of histo-
rians should be the aspiration to narrow this gap. The experience of Ger-
many and other countries shows that, in this case, of special importance is 
the so called “processing” of the past, which involves rethinking of histori-
cal meanings and adjusting them to the expectations and values of the con-
temporary society. In most cases, the pioneers of such rethinking are histo-
rians who have an opportunity — owing to the nature of their profession — 
to see the discrepancies between the “generally accepted” perception of the 
past and the facts contained in documents and suggested by the elementary 
logic. 
In the post-Soviet space such processing of the past, which is con-
nected to the changes in general attitudes, was determined not only by the 
disintegration of the “socialistic camp”, but also by the goals that were set 
above the society in the states that found themselves on the path of politi-
cal, social, and economic reforms [4; 10]. For example, the implementation 
of foreign policy and economic priorities identified in Lithuania in the 
1990s resulted in the reconsideration of historical images connected to 
Lithuanian-German, Lithuanian-Polish and other relations. The implemen-
tation of different strategies helped the negative experience of these rela-
tions stop to reproduce and develop, at least, as the dominant positions of 
the social discourse. However, the experience of Lithuanian-Russian rela-
tions started to be evaluated with the help of completely different strate-
gies, which, as it was stressed before [2, p. 451—456], was to a great ex-
tent a result of the influence of internal political factors. It seems that such 
dependence on different internal and external priorities is characteristic not 
only of Lithuania, but also of Russia. The formation of value orientation 
with the use of certain historical symbols and images also depends on the 
focus on a certain audience — internal, Eastern European, or Western Eu-
ropean [13, p. 250]. The question as to what benefit it brings to both parties 
cannot be considered rhetorical anymore. 
What hampers a productive progressing of the past in the Lithuanian-
Russian space? Probably, it is a space where the categories of “historical 
truth” and “falsehood” still preoccupy the minds of many; a space that 
lacks mutual respect for national myths and predominant memory con-
structs. Such respect can develop only through communication and under-
standing of each other; contradictions with someone’s “historical truth” 
arising in this process should not become a handicap which makes it im-
possible to respect a different opinion and understand not only the need of 
certain beliefs in certain situations, but also the reasons behind it. Only 
when such an understanding emerges one might ask cautiously whether 
these myths and constructs are really necessary in the view of all the con-
sequences they lead to. 
Is it really impossible to harmonise the opposite positions? What is the role 
of historians in this process? Can historical research facilitate the reconsideration 
of the past in the Lithuanian-Russian space (and if it can, how exactly)? 
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The essence of historical research — infinite extension 
of knowledge about the past or fulfilment of functions? 
 
Just recently historians thought that a deep study into the methodology of 
analysing historical sources helps them play the role of “oracles” of the past 
who have an exclusive right to talk about it. However, the creation of a 
common market, as well as developments in the different types of communi-
cation, which have taken place over the recent decades, emphasise the fact 
that the works of historians are just one of the sources, on the basis of which 
the social reception of the past is formed. By many parameters, this source is 
at a disadvantage compared with more “popular” representations of the past 
which put attractiveness above accuracy — movies, fiction, and even com-
puter games. Thus, a “traditional” historian, who receives his/her salary for 
continuous extension of knowledge about the past, becomes something not 
unlike a dinosaur. Thus, of growing importance is the question as to what 
role the historians should play in a society, where the interest in the past is 
increasing not because of an aspiration to understand the outer world, but for 
the pleasure of consumption which entails a simplification and distortion of 
historical meanings. 
Let me draw two opposite examples of the choice of such roles made by 
historians. The first example: historians using their specialised knowledge and 
adapting to the prevalent cultural practices oriented towards unlimited con-
sumption can play the role of consultants where such services are required by 
the developers of goods and brands. They can help create plots and images 
that can be used for the legitimation of goods and brands in the consumer 
market, i. e. for their more “valid” historical background. The second example: 
properly channelled historical studies can facilitate real changes in the public 
self-perception and attitude to the others. If we admit that the peaceful coexis-
tence of societies is a value in itself, and the upkeep of negative images and 
the implementation of other strategies of cultural opposition is just a tool in the 
hands of manipulators acting in the public discourse, historians can and even 
must focus on those areas that correspond to such value. 
The choice of a research area is always a prerogative of the historians 
themselves, thus the central question is what effect the choice of this or that 
role will have. Will this effect be short-term and aimed at consumption, or 
vice versa long-term, oriented towards the progressing of the past by con-
centrating on the issues standing in the way of peaceful coexistence of dif-
ferent societies? If the latter is chosen, the major step is the understanding of 
each other’s past and the motivation behind the other society’s need for cer-
tain perceptions of the past. 
 
Studies into the culture of remembrance — a sphere of historical knowledge 
“in vogue” or a response to the need for coexistence? 
 
The history of creating symbols and images of the past, their social re-
production in the form of texts, rituals, holidays, and material objects is one 
of the most discussed topics of contemporary European historiography. The 
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aggregate of such studies creates a phenomenon which can be simplistically 
called a thematic field of memory. However, the interest in this topic which 
has been persistent over the last three decades is not only connected with the 
fact that memory is a new “fashion” in the historiography. First of all, mem-
ory is important, because it helps people distinguish between “their” and “al-
ien” past in the present. 
A productive analytical category which makes it possible to reason about 
relations to the past in different historical and contemporary societies is the 
term “culture of remembrance”. Having been introduced into scientific usage 
by the cultural scientist, Jan Assmann, in the early 1990s [6, p. 30—31], this 
term has found a wide application in the interdisciplinary research (first of 
all, in Germany). General trends were described by the historian Christoph 
Cornelißen, who proposed that “culture of remembrance” is to be perceived 
as the most generic term applicable to all possible forms of conscious re-
membrance of historical events, persons, and processes [8, p. 555]. 
I define culture of remembrance as a system of meanings which is 
formed by different methods of representation actualising the past and stimu-
lating the “collective memory” 1. Such a definition suggests that the research 
object of culture of remembrance is the processes of creating meanings that 
constantly take place in the milieu of social communication. These are the 
processes that regulate, support, and transform the memory of people — the 
participants of a certain communication milieu. The understanding of the 
structure of meanings, which determines all the behaviour relating to the 
past, including concrete actions actualising the past, in fact, comprises re-
search on the culture of remembrance. 
Researchers engaged in the analysis of the culture of remembrance ob-
serve a characteristic of community’s self-perception, which can manifest 
itself in the roles of either the victor, or the defeated, the guilty or the victim. 
They stress that many societies facing a certain influence apply similar strat-
egies of adaptation, mourning, oblivion, silencing, “repression” of un-
pleasant and traumatising memories [5, p. 62—116]. On the other hand, de-
spite the similarities in the strategies for handling the past, each culture of 
remembrance (which can exist at the national, group, confessional, and other 
levels) features an original set of meanings relating to the past, which fulfil 
the function of what J. Assmann calls the “connective structure” of society. 
These meanings unite the society through explaining why we are like this 
and who we are in relation to the others (see also [7; 9]). 
Thus, an analysis of the cultures of remembrance gives an opportunity to 
define the values underlying any culture that has anything in common with 
the past. A study into the cultures of remembrance is a discovery of the ac-
tual state of affairs and unveiling the reasons behind it. When analysing the 
cultures of remembrance, one can learn how these cultures perceive them-
selves in relation not only to the past, but also the future since the values 
                                                     
1 Collective memory is defined as one of the components of human memory, where 
the “content” of recalled meanings is supported and transformed under the influence 
of everyday or formalised group communication. 
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supported by memories are always projected in the future. Moreover, this 
analysis gives an opportunity to evaluate whether the projection of the cul-
ture into the future, which develops this or that way in any society, corre-
sponds to the values supported by the remembrance of the past. 
It is paradoxical, but such a correlation is rarely observed, especially in 
the cases when societies deal with different systems of values at the same 
time. The point is that, alongside general values characteristic of many cul-
tures there are values that are supported on a daily basis within communica-
tion milieus. Thus, the degree of originality of a culture predetermines the 
degree of originality of perception of the past characteristic of only this par-
ticular culture. The strategy used in case of collision of such cultures de-
pends on a different factor which is called “politics of history” or “politics of 
remembrance” in professional literature. It is a force manifested in the dis-
course on the past, which strengthens some memories and mitigates the oth-
ers, biasing the carriers of one’s own memories against the others or attempt-
ing to reconcile them. It is this factor that facilitates the formation of corre-
sponding relations between different cultures of remembrance within one 
state or between states. This relation can be either adapting or suppressing, 
conflict or coexistence-oriented. 
It is not historians who decide what strategies will be used, but historians 
can use their research to create prerequisites for the application of a certain 
strategy. Let us consider the actual state of affairs in Lithuanian-Russian 
space. What impact may historical research, aimed at understanding the 
characteristics of mutual cultures of remembrance as well as meanings and 
values they are based on, have in the space of these two states? 
 
Gleams and interruptions in the relationship between cultures  
of remembrance in the Russian-Lithuanian space 
 
The prevalent cultures of remembrance supported at the national level in 
Russia and Lithuania can be discussed in two different ways through an in-
dependent identification of their characteristic meanings and strategies. 
Many meanings are opposite in these cultures; however, when discussing 
strategies used in constructing these meanings and values, one can notice 
more than one similarity. In both cultures of remembrance, the role of the 
foundational myth, the sacralised narrative explaining the present, is played 
by a story about the transformation of the society, where the basic categories 
are those of the victor and the defeated (victim). In Lithuania, for more than 
two decades, it has been a story of transformation from the victim into the 
victor. The period of WWII and the first post-war years are associated in this 
story with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and are described using such terms 
as “occupation”, “enforced deportation”, “resistance”, “genocide”, which at-
taches the victim status to Lithuania (moreover, a victim that was injured by 
the Soviet Union more than by Germany), whereas the collapse of the USSR 
is associated with the terms of “liberation”, “independence”, the restoration 
of independence, i. e. a victory. In Russia, vice versa, it is a story of trans-
formation from the “victor” into the “victim”. The period of World War II is 
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associated mostly with the symbol of the Victory over Germany, which 
made the Soviet Union a liberator of the nations of Eastern Europe (includ-
ing Lithuania), whereas the disintegration of the USSR is linked to the status 
of a “victim”, for its collapse is often perceived negatively, as a great tragedy 
after which Russia faced the period of “decline”2. 
In both countries, the politics of history connects the values formed in 
the present with the status of a victor. In modern Russia, not unlike the 
Brezhnev era, the greatest and unrivalled historical value is the victory in 
WWII (or, more precisely, the Great Patriotic War). In Lithuania, the histori-
cal policy of the recent decades turned into the highest value the fight for in-
dependence and the symbol of restoration of independence, i. e. the secession 
from the USSR. Such a situation, when the current values are formed in the 
context of the status of a victor are a typical characteristic of a “young” poli-
tics of history in the states that aspire to strengthen thus their position, their 
morality and be acknowledged and respected by the others. The others 
should understand that victory is important not only for those who enjoy this 
status, but also for themselves. It can explain the fact that Russian politics of 
history — in the expectation of the recognition of the Soviet contribution to 
the common cause — tries to reconcile the important for Russia symbol of 
the Victory with the European practices of commemorating World War II. 
Lithuanian historical policy follows the same line, sometimes making at-
tempts to present its victory as a contribution to the common cause — the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire”. 
It means that, despite an opposite assessment of the same historical sym-
bols and images (cf. [10; 12]), Lithuania and Russia use similar strategies of 
reconstructing values through both the prevalent culture of remembrance and 
politics of history. It is important to understand this, because there is not and 
there cannot be a single “right” system of values or a “good” or “bad” cul-
ture of remembrance. On the other hand, the issue of their appropriate cor-
relation and hence the adequacy of politics of history in Lithuanian-Russian 
relations seem to be a question open to discussion, especially because the 
trends of politics of history, unlike those of culture of remembrance, relate 
not only to the formation of certain values, but, first of all, to the strategies 
of legitimation chosen by the corresponding regimes. The weaker is the in-
fluence of the regime agents on the prevalent perceptions of the past in the 
public discourse, the greater is the need to develop the symbols and images 
of the past, which would legitimate the policies of the regime. 
In effect, it is the reason why the discrepancies, which exist in different 
cultures of remembrance because of the difference between these cultures 
becomes the subjects of disagreements and gives rise to the competition for 
the identification of a single and unquestionable “historical truth”. The con-
fusion starts when such a competition is recognised as the only kind of mu-
tual relations. In effect, there are other ways. When positions clash, one can 
                                                     
2 As the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, emphasised, “one must admit that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical catastrophe of the century. For 
the Russian nation it became a real tragedy” [1]. 
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sidestep it, but one can also solve it by means of an honest dialogue and a s-
earch for common grounds. The problem can be solved through an argument 
about who is right and who is wrong, in which it is not logic and arguments, 
but strength that often wins, but one can also use the method of evaluation of 
arguments, the needs of societies, and search for common values. It is a par-
adox, but the contemporary Lithuanian-Russian relations combine both 
methods, i. e. they feature both the enforcement of a singe “historical truth”, 
and a discussion. It results in the progress from point A to point A — the 
problem is not being solved, probably, because the agents of the regime do 
not fully understand the objectives and functions of politics of history. 
Let me draw two examples of parallel processes. Over the last five years, 
similarly trivial trends towards suppressing dissent related to the founda-
tional myth of the nation emerged both in Lithuania and Russia. On June 17, 
2008, the Lithuanian Seimas adopted an amendment to the Law on Public 
Assembly, which forbade the demonstration of any symbols of not only Nazi 
Germany, but also the Soviet Union (including the Lithuanian SSR) during 
public assemblies. Two years later, on June 15, 2010, an amendment to the 
Civil Code of Lithuania was adopted, which imposed criminal liability for 
the denial of genocide and other crimes against humanity, as well as public 
approval of Soviet and German aggression against Lithuania, approval of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the terri-
tory of Lithuania or against Lithuanian citizens, and approval of aggression 
against the Lithuanian Republic in 1990—1991. In this connection, one 
should recall that the Lithuanian definition of genocide is quite peculiar; the 
Lithuanian legislation suggests that the genocide was also committed against 
Lithuanians [2]. In effect, similar trends also develop in Russia, where, in 
February 2009, Minister Sergei Shoigu proposed to introduce criminal li-
ability for the denial of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, 
whereas a decree of the President of the Russian Federation of May 15, 
2009, created a Presidential Commission to Counter Attempts to Falsify His-
tory to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests, which consists of representatives 
of special services and the Administration of the President. 
In my opinion, such trends are, first of all, a result of the discrepancies 
that are caused by a clash of two different value systems and the generations 
for whom they are relevant. On the one hand, the older generation does not 
want to put up with the “relativisation” of the “historical truth” and the situa-
tion when the same events can be evaluated differently. On the other hand, 
an increasing number of alternative evaluations penetrate the same commu-
nication milieu which is dominated by traditional attitudes, and the logic of 
“discourse protection” makes one try to deliver the meanings that have the 
status of the most “sacred” from “defilement” thus criminalising such “de-
filement” by institutional methods. The meanings of certain events of the 
past selected to cherish show what meanings are considered prevalent in the 
process of formation of a common identity. 
However, the mentioned criminalisation is not the only means to solve 
the problem. It is sufficient to acknowledge that it is characteristic of original 
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cultures (thus they are original) to have different perceptions of the past and 
it would be illogical to demand that one culture should adopt the “historical 
truth” of the other. The central questions are why many neighbouring states 
can ignore the differences in the perceptions of the past without actualising 
the components that can strengthen the opposition and conflict in the present 
and why the relations between other states should be based on attempts to 
impose a single perception of the past. In other words, we should find the 
answer as to why the issue of the acknowledgement of the occupation of the 
Baltic States or the evaluation of the participation of Lithuanian, Latvian, 
and Estonian residents in the SS and Wehrmacht structures should be a con-
ditio sine qua non — an issue that requires a single opinion, without having 
which it is impossible to make a step forward within modern intergovern-
mental relations. 
Probably, a certain attempt to resolve such an issue was to be the com-
mission of Lithuanian and Russian historians established in February 2006 
on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the Ministries of Education and 
Science of Lithuania and Russia (both parties have established such commis-
sions also with other countries). Alongside research workshops and confer-
ences, which feature productive discussions on the past, one of the major re-
sults of cooperation between the members of the commission, who predomi-
nantly represent the Lithuanian Institute of History and the Institute of Gen-
eral History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is the two-volume collec-
tion of papers entitled “The USSR and Lithuania in the years of World War 
II”. The first volume (“The USSR and the Lithuanian Republic (March 
1939 — August 1940)”) was published in Lithuania at the beginning of 
2006 [3]; the second one, which is dedicated to the Lithuanian issue in the 
international relations of 1940—1945, was completed at the end of 2011. 
The publication of the first volume provoked an inadequate reaction both 
in Lithuania and (moreover) in Russia. Probably, it was due to this reaction 
that the completion of the second volume was postponed. It might partly 
have contributed to the above mentioned determination to criminalise the 
“historical falsehood”. 
Anyway, the publication of a two-volume collection of papers is only the 
first, though significant, contribution to the discussion, as well as a step to-
wards a more adequate perception of each other. As it was expected earlier, 
this general trend can be followed by research into the cultures of remem-
brance, the analysis of which can shift the processing of the past to com-
pletely different grounds. The processing of the past cannot become efficient 
if it is conducted at the “upper” level — the academic or political one. It can 
be efficient if it is supported by values that do not need a separate or an ad-
ditional public legitimation. 
That is why there is a need to study the values and perceptions of the 
past that are formed and supported and whose necessity is justified this or 
that way in a certain society. Even small progress in the progressing of the 
past requires steps taken in view of this values and perceptions against the 
background of harmonising the old and the new, rather than a mere intro-
duction of the new. At the same time, one should take into account that the 
International history 
 12
progressing of the past will never yield positive results if it is used for the 
purpose of manipulation. The motivation behind such progressing should be 
clear for anyone, and the achievement of its targets should lie in a consensus. 
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